JOSE ALTUVE DEEP DIVE

Here's the version of Jose Altuve the Astros should expect to see in 2021

Altuve was terrific in the postseason. Photo by Jim McIsaac/Getty Images

Jose Altuve had a similar season to his middle infield counterpart Carlos Correa. Both had subpar regular seasons at the plate before lighting it up in the postseason. Altuve is under contract through 2024, so there aren't any extension questions like there are for Correa, but Altuve's performance is vital to the Astros future success. Which version of Altuve is real? The regular season one or the postseason one?

Hard Hit % - 33.3%

Barrel % - 4.6%

K% - 18.6%

BB% - 8.1%

Chase % - 35.2%

(Above numbers from 2020)

There are a few statistical changes for Altuve in 2020 from past seasons. First, his Barrel % dropped from 8.1% to 4.6%. That would be his lowest Barrel % since 2015 (3.1%), which was the last season before Altuve began a swing overhaul to start working more uphill and drive the ball more. Altuve had established himself as a star by then, but he was hardly a home run threat, and he relied more on his speed.

Next, his Chase % increased to 35.2%. That was a 5.2% increase from 2019 and 2018, when he had exactly 30% marks both times. Again, it was the highest his Chase % has been since 2015, when it was 34.1%. However, Altuve made contact on those swings 79.7% of the time. In 2020, he made contact on chase swings just 67.3% of the time. Altuve has a reputation as a good bad ball hitter, but he's gotten worse and worse at that the older he's gotten. Is it because of age? No. It's because of swing change.

Look at the evolution of Altuve's swing from '14 to '17. In '14 and '15, Altuve clearly swung downhill. He's not thinking about driving the ball whatsoever; he's just trying to put the bat on the ball and find a hole. While '16 & '17 are also ground balls, the swings are completely different. In the latter two swings, he's working more uphill, his bat enters the zone at a more vertical angle, and he's trying to drive the baseball.

The swing evolution is a good thing. It's why Altuve is a better overall hitter now than he was then. It just means that he isn't able to do as much with those pitches off the plate. He has to wait for a ball he can drive.

Year

Chase %

Chase Contact %

Slugging %

2015

34.1%

79.7%

.459

2016

30.5%

75.1%

.531

2017

31.8%

72.3%

.547

2018

30%

70.3%

.451

2019

30%

68.6%

.550

2020

35.2%

67.3%

.344

The outliers here are 2018 and 2020. Remember, Altuve was playing on a bad knee for a good portion of 2018, and that played the biggest factor in the dip in power production. In 2020, it's the chase rate and all the other factors of a COVID season.

So how did Altuve turn around his performance in the postseason? He started chasing less. Postseason splits aren't provided for those statistics, so I went through each postseason game and tallied his discipline. Here are the results:

  • Saw 173 pitches outside the strike zone
  • Chased 31 times
  • Chase % - 17.9%

He cut his Chase % in half. Essentially, Altuve went from chasing about as often as Kansas City Royals shortstop Adalberto Mondesi to chasing about as often as teammate Alex Bregman. Altuve's Hard Hit % in the 2020 postseason was 41%, a 7% improvement on his regular season mark. It makes sense, as pitchers are forced to come to hitters and give them pitches they can do more damage with if they chase less often. It resulted in a postseason where he slashed .375/.500/.729 with five homers and walked more than he struck out (11 BB vs. 8 K).

Altuve also had some indicators of bad luck that made his regular season numbers look worse than they really should have been. He had a .250 BABIP (Batting Average on Balls In Play), which is a .053 point drop from last season, and it's .084 below his career mark. His .230 xBA (Expected Batting Average) isn't great, but it's still a touch better than the .219 he finished with. Similarly, his .352 xSLG isn't great, but it's a little better than the .344 SLG he actually recorded. Altuve, for his entire career, has outperformed his expected statistics. Altuve has outperformed his xBA in every season since Statcast was adopted (2015). He's outperformed his xSLG in all but one season. That doesn't mean Altuve has been perpetually lucky and that luck finally turned, it means that a "normal" Altuve will outperform those metrics, and it was unlucky this year that he didn't.

Some people may be concerned that Altuve is losing some athleticism now that he's on the wrong side of 30. There aren't any signs of him losing a step. His 28.4 ft/s average sprint speed is just 0.2 ft/s worse than last year. It's better than 2017 and 2018, and it's tied with 2015 and 2016. He's the same runner he's always been. Altuve was in the 89th percentile in MLB in sprint speed. Altuve was the second fastest player on the Astros, just 0.2 ft/s behind Myles Straw.

Altuve isn't over the hill yet. He proved in the postseason that he's still an elite hitter when he's on his game. As long as he fixes the issues he had with expanding the zone in 2020, he should be back to the Altuve of old for the entirety of 2021.

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Nick Caserio's history of drafting injury prone players has become a problem. Composite Getty Image.

Nick Caserio was hired to serve as the general manager (GM) of the Texans on January 7, 2021. Some saw it as another nod to the organization's obsession with the Patriots. Others saw it as the team finally getting their guy after pursuing him previously. They were even hit with a tampering charge while trying to talk to him about the job. Since he's been on the job, there have been highs and lows.

Recently, the news about Kenyon Green and Derek Stingley Jr put a stain on his tenure. Green was placed on season-ending injured reserve (IR) and Stingley Jr is expected to be placed on IR, likely missing six to eight weeks, per Aaron Wilson. Both guys were Caserio's 2022 first rounders. Both guys are starting to look like busts and have fans a little more than just upset.

Green's case was curious because he was said to have needed surgery before he tore his labrum during the Saints preseason game. He had knee surgery this past offseason. There were knee injury concerns when he was coming out of A&M. Adding to his injuries, Green has played poorly. To make matters worse, the Chargers drafted fellow guard Zion Johnson two picks later. Johnson played all 17 games last season as a rookie at right guard and has moved to left guard this season. The pick used to draft Green was part of a trade back with the Eagles. They used the 13th overall pick to take Georgia defensive tackle Jordan Davis, a guy at a position this team could desperately use.

Stingley Jr was a highly touted recruit coming into LSU as a freshman. He played as well as any corner in the country that year. Oh, and they won a national title with arguably one of the best teams in college football history. His net two years in Baton Rouge were marred with injuries. Some believed his junior year was more him holding back to stay healthy for the draft. It worked because he was taken third overall, one spot ahead of Sauce Gardner. Gardner went on to be an All Pro as a rookie. While he's surrounded by more talent on the Jets' defense, people will forever link them because Stingley Jr hasn't lived up to expectations. He missed six games last season and is set to miss at least that many this season. When he has played, he's looked okay. “Okay” isn't what you want from a guy drafted third overall ahead of the other guy who was widely considered better than him.

For the 2021 draft, Caserio was handcuffed. He had no first or second rounders, and made a few trades that lessened his draft pool from eight to five picks. Of the five guys drafted that year, only Nico Collins seems to be a player. The 2022 draft was more productive. Although Green and Stingley Jr were the headliners and haven't played up to the hype, the others are carrying the load. Jalen Pitre and Dameon PIerce alone make that draft class dope. This past draft was seen as the one to save the franchise so to speak. Getting C.J. Stroud and Will Anderson Jr got the team a franchise quarterback and edge rusher with picks two and three overall. The price paid to move back up to three was hefty and puts more scrutiny on Anderson Jr. They appear, so far, to have also found a couple other nice players. Tank Dell being the hidden gem of this class.

While people can't, and shouldn't, base Caserio's performance strictly off of the guys he's drafted, one must call it into question. The '21 draft was a wash. The '22 draft looks suspect, but has some redeeming qualities. The '23 draft will most likely be his saving grace. But should it? Former Texans GM Rick Smith nailed almost every first rounder he drafted. Even he was almost run out of town because folks didn't like what he did. Why should Caserio be any different? So what if he cleaned up the mess by the previous regime! That's what he was hired to do!

“Keep that same energy!” That phrase is used when people try to hold others to different standards. Where's that energy everyone had for Bill O'Brien, Jack Easterby, Rick Smith, Gary Kubiak, David Culley, and Lovie Smith? When others weren't performing well, their heads were called for. I see some people holding Caserio accountable. For the most part, it appears as if he's getting a bit of a pass. I'll be interested to see if this continues should the team has another subpar season. If that pick they traded to the Cardinals is another top 10 pick and the Browns pick the Texans own isn't...if Green can't come back and/or Stingley Jr doesn't show any signs of being a lockdown corner...then what? Let's hope none of this comes to fruition. If it does, we'll have to revisit this conversation.

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